“becoming increasingly solid…downside risk to the growth outlook have further diminished…all other features of our forward guidance are of a parametric nature and can be recalibrated depending on incoming data…”. Praet, 4 de mayo.

Partiendo de los comentarios anteriores, ¿podrían producirse sorpresas en la reunión del BCE del 8 de junio?.

Esto es lo que añade Praet: “to draw on a more expanded information set than is available today, organized around new projections and including an updated assessment of the distribution of risk surrounding the economic outlook”.

¿Y la evolución de los tipos de interés? Dependerá…de los datos.

Más allá de la posibilidad de normalizar los tipos de interés, cuando la mayoría de los bancos centrales admiten que el nivel “normal” de tipos de interés en el futuro será menor al del pasado; de hecho, la excepcionalidad de la crisis llevó a los principales bancos centrales a tomar decisiones también excepcionales. Y aquí hablamos de medidas monetarias no tradicionales, como la compra de activos y las operaciones de préstamo a medio plazo que han llevado a un tamaño de balance promedio cercano al 20 % del PIB.

¿Cómo será la futura normalidad en política monetaria?

“We ask whether recent changes in monetary policy due to the financial crisis will be temporary or permanent. We present evidence from two surveys—one of central bank governors, the other of academic specialists. We find that central banks in crisis countries are more likely to have resorted to new policies, to have had discussions about mandates, and to have communicated more. But the thinking has changed more broadly—for instance, central banks in non-crisis countries also report having implemented macro-prudential measures. Overall, we expect central banks in the future to have broader mandates, use macro-prudential tools more widely, and communicate more actively than before the crisis. While there is no consensus yet about the usefulness of unconventional monetary policies, we expect most of them will remain in central banks’ toolkits, as governors who gain experience with a particular tool are more likely to assess that tool positively”.

En definitiva, una política monetaria más abierta que en el pasado con respecto a objetivos a perseguir. Y en instrumentos a utilizar (incluyendo no convencionales) para alcanzarlos. Pero, especialmente,una política monetaria más activa en comunicación.

“Finally, our results suggest that there are some important differences between the views of academics and central bank heads. First, while many scholars typically support keeping most of the unconventional policies in central banks’ toolkits, central bank governors are considerably more skeptical, often saying that it is “too early to judge.” While those central bank governors who have gained hands-on experience with unconventional tools tend to assess these tools more positively, the cautious tone of many central bank governors about the future use of unconventional tools suggests that they still perceive a lot of uncertainty about their costs and benefits. Second, although governors and academics agree that central bank communication has become more frequent since the crisis, and that these changes are here to stay, or might even go further, there are differences on the usefulness of forward guidance as a policy and a communication tool. Academics have a strong preference for data-based forward guidance, whereas the most popular form of forward guidance among central bank governors is purely qualitative. Third, whereas central governors feel that they did not receive a lot of criticism for acting politically or crossing the line into the political realm during the crisis, most academic respondents think that central banks were criticized for crossing the line into politics.”

Claro que aún es pronto para valorarlo…o quizás no. Veremos.